3. Works and Installations Containing Dangerous Forces. Such works are marked with three bright orange circles, of similar size, placed on the same axis, the distance between each circle being one radius.109 Works and installations containing dangerous forces include dams, dikes, and nuclear power facilities.

X. MEANS OF WARFARE: WEAPONS
A. Means and Methods: The laws of war guide two related choices in combat: (1) the means, that is, the weapons used to fight; and (2) the methods, that is, the tactics of fighting. Parties to a conflict must observe the LOAC, or face consequences. “The right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited.”110 To properly advise war fighters, JAs must be proficient not only in what legally may be targeted, but how the objective can be targeted.
B. Legal Review. All U.S. weapons, weapons systems, and munitions must be reviewed by authorized attorneys within DoD for legality under the LOAC.111 Per DoDD 5000.01, this review occurs before the award of the engineering and manufacturing development contract and again before the award of the initial production contract. Legal review of new weapons is also required under Article 36 of AP I.
1. Effect of legal review. The weapons review process of the United States entitles commanders and all other personnel to assume that any weapon or munition contained in the U.S. military inventory and issued to military personnel is lawful. If there are any doubts, questions may be directed to the International and Operational Law Division (HQDA, DAJA-IO), Office of The Judge Advocate General of the Army. The Center for Law and Military Operations (CLAMO) at The Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School (TJAGLCS) maintains a database of approved weapons reviews.112
2. Illegal Weapons.
a. Weapons causing unnecessary suffering as determined by the “usage of states,” are per se illegal.
Examples of such illegal weapons include lances with barbed heads and projectiles filled with glass.113
b. Other weapons have been rendered illegal by agreement or prohibited by specific treaties. Certain land mines, booby traps, and “blinding laser weapons” are prohibited by Protocols to the CCW. Anti-personnel land mines and booby traps were regulated (and, in some cases, certain types prohibited) in order to provide increased protection for the civilian population. Specific weapons prohibitions are discussed more below.
3. Improper use of legal weapons. Any weapon may be used unlawfully; for example, use of an M9 pistol to murder a POW. This may not be a violation of the principle of “unnecessary suffering,” but would most likely violate the principles of necessity and distinction. However, use of an M9 pistol to wound a combatant in various parts of his body with the intent to watch that combatant suffer would be a violation of the principle of unnecessary suffering.
C. Specific Weapons Treaties. Certain weapons are the subject of specific treaties or other international law instruments of which JAs need to be aware:
1. Certain Conventional Weapons.114 The 1980 United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) is the leading and preferred U.S. framework to restrict, regulate, or prohibit the use of certain otherwise lawful conventional weapons. The United States has ratified the CCW and its five Protocols described below, plus Amended Protocol II. The LOAC DocSupp reprints the CCW and its Protocols. In summary:
a. Protocol I prohibits any weapon whose primary effect is to injure by fragments which, when in the human body, escape detection by x-ray.
b. Protocol II regulates use of mines, booby-traps, and other devices, while prohibiting certain types of anti-personnel mines to increase protection for the civilian population. Amended Mines Protocol (AMP) II has since replaced the original Protocol II. The United States regards certain land mines (anti-personnel and anti­

109 AP I, annex I, art. 16.
110 Hague IV, art. 22.
111 See generally DODD 5000.01; AR 27-53; SECNAVINST 5000.2E; U.S. DEP’T OF AIR FORCE, AIR FORCE INSTRUCTION 51-402, WEAPONS REVIEW (27 Jul 2011) [hereinafter AFI 51-402].
112 See CLAMO website at http://www.jagcnet.army.mil/clamo (contact CLAMO for authorization).
113 FM 27-10, para. 34.
114 See generally CCW.
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vehicle) as lawful weapons, subject to the restrictions contained in CCW AMP II and national policy. U.S. military doctrine and mine inventory comply with each, for example, command detonated Claymore mines. Many nations (but not the United States) are party to a competing treaty, the 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (also known as the Ottawa Treaty or Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention), an NGO-initiated treaty with more sweeping prohibitions on anti­ personnel landmines.115 Per a February 2004 U.S. Presidential Memorandum, and after its 2010 deadline, the United States no longer employs anti-personnel landmines that do not self-destruct or self-neutralize (sometimes called “dumb” or “persistent” anti-personnel land (APL) mines).116 U.S. forces may no longer employ persistent APL or persistent anti-vehicle land mines.
a. Protocol III regulates the use of incendiary weapons to increase civilian population protections. Napalm, flame-throwers, and thermite/thermate type weapons are incendiary weapons. Protocol III, Article 1(b) states that incendiaries do not include munitions with incidental incendiary effects such as “illuminants, tracers, smoke or signaling systems;” or munitions designed to combine “penetration, blast, or fragmentation effects with an additional incendiary effect”—particularly when the munition’s primary purpose is not burn injury to persons. Thus, white phosphorous is legal when used as a tracer or illuminant, or in appropriate combined effects munitions. The United States ratified Protocol III with the reservation that incendiary weapons may be used against military objectives in areas of civilian concentrations if such use will cause fewer civilian casualties; for example, against a chemical munitions factory in a city to incinerate escaping poisonous gases.
b. Protocol IV prohibits “blinding laser weapons,” defined as laser weapons specifically designed to cause permanent blindness to unenhanced vision. Other lasers are lawful, even those that may cause injuries including permanent blindness, incidental to their legitimate military use (range-finding, targeting, etc.).
c. Protocol V on explosive remnants of war requires the parties to an armed conflict, where feasible, to clear or assist the host nation or others in clearance of unexploded ordnance or abandoned explosive ordnance after cessation of active hostilities.
2. Cluster Bombs or Combined Effects Munitions (CM). CM constitute effective weapons against a variety of targets, such as air defense radars, armor, artillery, and large enemy personnel concentrations. Since the bomblets or submunitions dispense over a relatively large area and a small percentage typically fail to detonate, this may create an unexploded ordinance (UXO) hazard. CMs are not mines, are acceptable under the laws of armed conflict, and are not timed to go off as anti-personnel devices. However, disturbing or disassembling submunitions may explode them and cause civilian casualties.
a. Another NGO-initiated treaty, the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions, prohibits development, production, stockpiling, retention or transfer of cluster munitions (CM) between signatory States. Also known as the Oslo Process, this recent treaty binds many U.S. allies, but most nations that manufacture or use CMs still reject it. The United States is not a party as it continues to use CMs for certain targets as described above, but lobbied to preserve interoperability for non-signatory states to use and stockpile CM even during multinational operations.
b. The Secretary of Defense has signed a DoD Cluster Munitions Policy mandating by 2018 a reduction of obsolete CM stocks, improvement of CM UXO standards to 1%, and replacement of existing stocks.117 From 2008-2011, the United States also sponsored an unsuccessful effort to add a new CCW Protocol regulating— but not banning—cluster munitions.118 Current U.S. practice is to mark coordinates and munitions expended for all uses of cluster munitions, and to engage in early and aggressive EOD clearing efforts as soon as practicable.119
3. Small Arms Projectiles. The 1868 Declaration of St. Petersburg prohibits exploding rounds of less than 400 grams. The United States is not a State Party to this declaration, and does not regard it as CIL. State practice since 1868 has limited this prohibition to projectiles weighing less than 400 grams specifically designed to detonate in the human body. Expanding military small arms ammunition—that is, so called ‘dum­

115 See The International Campaign to Ban Land Mines, at http://www.icbl.org/ (includes treaty history, text, and parties).
116 U.S. Land Mine Policy can be found at http://www.state.gov/t/pm/wra/.
117 See Robert M. Gates, Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Dep’ts et. al., SUBJECT: DoD Policy on Cluster Munitions and Unintended Harm to Civilians, 19 June 2008, available at http://www.defense.gov/news/d20080709cmpolicy.pdf.
118 See U.S. Dep’t of State, Statement of the [US] on the Outcome of the Fourth Review Conference of the CCW, Nov. 25, 2011,
at http://geneva.usmission.gov/2011/11/25/u-s-deeply-disappointed-by-ccws-f.... 119 See U.S. DoD Report to Congress: Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After Action Report. See also Thomas Herthel, On the Chopping Block: Cluster Munitions and the Law of War, 51 A.F.L. REV. 229 (2001).

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dum’ projectiles, such as soft-nosed (exposed lead core) or hollow point projectiles—are prohibited by the 1899 Hague Declaration Concerning Expanding Bullets. The United States is not a party to this treaty, but has taken the position that it will adhere to its terms in its military operations in international armed conflict to the extent that its application is consistent with the object and purpose of Article 23(e) of Hague IV. The prohibition on hollow point/soft nosed military projectiles does not prohibit full-metal jacketed projectiles that yaw or fragment, or “open tip” rifle projectiles containing a tiny aperture to increase accuracy.
4. Hollow point or soft point ammunition. Hollow point or soft-point ammunition contain projectiles with either a hollow point that bores into the lead core or an exposed lead core that flattens easily in the human body. These types of ammunition are designed to expand dramatically upon impact at all ranges.
a. This ammunition is prohibited for use in international armed conflict against lawful enemy combatants (see discussion of 1899 Hague Declaration, above). There are situations, however, outside of international armed conflict, where use of this ammunition is lawful because its use will significantly reduce the risk of incidental damage to innocent civilians and friendly force personnel, protected property (e.g., during a hostage rescue or for aircraft security), and material containing hazardous materials. Military law enforcement personnel may be authorized to use this ammunition for law enforcement missions outside an active theater of operations.
b. Military units or personnel are not entitled to possess or use small arms ammunition not issued to them or expressly authorized. Private acquisition of small arms ammunition for operational use is prohibited.
c. “MatchKing” ammunition (or similar rifle projectiles produced by other manufacturers) has an open tip, with a tiny aperture not designed to cause expansion. This design enhances accuracy only, and does not function like hollow or soft point projectiles. “MatchKing” ammunition is lawful for use across the conflict spectrum, provided that the ammunition was issued and not personally procured. However, this ammunition may not be modified by soldiers (such as through further opening the tiny aperture to increase the possibility of expansion).
5. Poison. Poison has been outlawed for generations, and is prohibited by treaty.120
6. Biological Weapons.121 The 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol prohibited only biological (bacteriological) weapon use. The 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) extended this prohibition, prohibiting development, production, stockpiling, acquisition, or retention of biological agents or toxins, weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict.122 The United States has renounced all use of biological and toxin weapons.
7. Chemical Weapons.123 The 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol prohibits use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous, or other gases (and bacteriological weapons; see below). Initially, the United States reserved the right to respond with chemical weapons to a chemical or biological weapons attack by the enemy. This reservation became moot when the United States in 1997 ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which prohibits production, acquisition, stockpiling, retention, and use of chemical weapons—even in retaliation.
a. Key Provisions. There are twenty-four articles in the CWC. Article 1 is the most important, and states Parties agree to never develop, produce, stockpile, transfer, use, or engage in military preparations to use chemical weapons. It strictly forbids retaliatory (second) use, which represents a significant departure from the Geneva Gas Protocol. The CWC requires the destruction of chemical stockpiles. It also forbids the use of Riot Control Agents (RCA) as a “method of warfare.” Article 3 requires parties to declare stocks of chemical weapons and facilities they possess. Articles 4 and 5 provide procedures for destruction and verification, including routine on-site inspections. Article 8 establishes the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPWC). Article 9 establishes the procedures for “challenge inspection,” which is a short-notice inspection in response to another party’s allegation of non-compliance.
b. Riot Control Agents (RCA). U.S. RCA Policy is found in Executive Order 11850. The policy applies to the use of Riot Control Agents and Herbicides, requiring presidential approval before first use in an international armed conflict.

120 Hague IV, art. 23(a).121 See 1925 Geneva Protocol; BWC.122 See BWC.123 See generally Geneva Gas Protocol; CWC.
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(1) Executive Order 11850.124 The order renounces first use of RCA in international armed conflicts except in defensive military modes to save lives. Such defensive lifesaving measures include: controlling riots in areas under direct and distinct U.S. military control, to include rioting prisoners of war; dispersing civilians where the enemy uses them to mask or screen an attack; rescue missions for downed pilots/passengers and escaping POWs in remote or isolated areas; and, in our rear echelon areas outside the zone of immediate combat, to protect convoys from civil disturbances, terrorists, and paramilitary organizations.
(2) The CWC prohibits RCA use as a “method of warfare.” “Method of warfare” is undefined. The Senate’s resolution of advice and consent for ratification to the CWC125 required that the President must certify that the United States is not restricted by the CWC in its use of riot control agents, including the use against “combatants” in any of the following cases: when the U.S. is not a party to the conflict, in consensual peacekeeping operations, and in Chapter VII (UN Charter) peace enforcement operations.126
(3) The implementation section of the Senate resolution requires that the President not modify
E.O. 11850. The President’s certification document of 25 April 1997 states that “the United States is not restricted by the convention in its use of riot control agents in various peacetime and peacekeeping operations. These are situations in which the United States is not engaged in the use of force of a scope, duration, and intensity that would trigger the laws of war with respect to U.S. forces.”
(4) Oleoresin Capsicum Pepper Spray (OC), or Cayenne Pepper Spray. The United States classifies OC as a Riot Control Agent.127
c. Herbicides. E.O. 11850 renounces first use in armed conflicts, except for domestic uses and to control vegetation around defensive areas.
8. Nuclear Weapons. Nuclear weapons are not prohibited by international law. On 8 July 1996, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) issued an advisory opinion that “[t]here is in neither customary nor international law any comprehensive and universal prohibition of the threat or use of nuclear weapons.” However, by a split vote, the ICJ also found that “[t]he threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict.” The Court stated that it could not definitively conclude whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defense, in which the very survival of the state would be at stake.128 Though the United States is party to numerous bilateral and other agreements regulating nuclear weapons, they remain a part of the U.S. weapons inventory.

II. MEANS OF WARFARE: STRATAGEMS AND TACTICS
A. Ruses.129 A ruse is “a trick of war designed to deceive the adversary, usually involving the deliberate exposure of false information to the adversary’s intelligence collection system,” 130 and involves injuring the enemy by legitimate deception.131 Ruses of war are permissible.132 Examples of ruses include the following:
1. Land Warfare. Creation of fictitious units by planting false information, putting up dummy installations, false radio transmissions, using a small force to simulate a large unit, feints, etc.133
EXAMPLE: 1991 Gulf War: Coalition forces, specifically XVIII Airborne Corps and VII Corps, used deception cells to create the impression that they were going to attack near the Kuwaiti boot heel, as opposed to the “left hook” strategy actually implemented. XVIII Airborne Corps set up “Forward Operating Base Weasel” near the

124 Exec. Order No. 11850, 3 C.F.R., 1971-1975 Comp, p. 980 (1975).
125 U.S. Senate Consent to Ratification of the CWC, S. Exec. Res. 75 sec. (2)(26), 105th Cong. (1997).
126 U.N. Charter ch. VI.
127 See DAJA-IO, Information Paper of 15 August 1996, Use of Oleoresin Capsicum (OC) Pepper Spray and other Riot Control
Agents (RCAs); DAJA-IO Memo of 20 September 1994, Subject: Request for Legal Review - Use of Oleoresin Capsicum Pepper Spray for Law Enforcement Purposes; CJCS Memo of 1 July 1994, Subject: Use of Riot Control Agents.
128 See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, paras. 90-97 (July 8).
129 FM 27-10, para. 48.
130 See JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 1-02, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DICTIONARY OF MILITARY AND ASSOCIATED
TERMS 317 (8 Nov. 2010, as amended through 31 Dec. 2010) (citation omitted).
131 Deception is defined as “[t]hose measures designed to mislead the enemy by manipulation, distortion, or falsification of evidence to induce the enemy to react in a manner prejudicial to the enemy’s interests.” Id. at 97.
132 Hague IV, art. 24.
133 FM 27-10, para. 51.

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boot heel, consisting of a phony network of camps manned by several dozen soldiers. Using portable radio equipment, cued by computers, phony radio messages were passed between fictitious headquarters. In addition, smoke generators and loudspeakers playing tape-recorded tank and truck noises were used, as were inflatable Humvees and helicopters.134
2. Use of Enemy Property. Use of enemy property to deceive is limited. Enemy property may be used to deceive under the following conditions:
a. Uniforms.135 Combatants may wear enemy uniforms but cannot fight in them with the intent to deceive. An escaping POW may wear an enemy uniform or civilian clothing to affect his escape.136 Military personnel captured in enemy uniform or civilian clothing risk being treated as spies.137
b. Colors. The U.S. position regarding the use of enemy flags is consistent with its practice regarding uniforms, i.e., the United States interprets the “improper use” of a national flag138 to permit the use of national colors and insignia of the enemy as a ruse as long as they are not employed during actual combat.139
c. Equipment. Forces must remove all enemy insignia in order to fight with the equipment. Captured supplies may be seized and used if state property. Private transportation, arms, and ammunition may be seized, but must be restored and compensation fixed when peace is made.140
d. AP I, Article 39(2), prohibits the use in international armed conflict of enemy flags, emblems, uniforms, or insignia while engaging in attacks or “to shield, favor, protect or impede military operations.” The United States does not consider this article reflective of customary law. This article, however, expressly does not apply to naval warfare.141 The U.S. position is that under the customary international law of naval warfare, it is permissible for a belligerent warship (both surface and subsurface) to fly false colors (including neutral and enemy colors) and display neutral or enemy markings or otherwise disguise its outward appearance in ways to deceive the enemy into believing the warship is of neutral or enemy nationality or is other than a warship. However, a warship must display her true colors prior to an actual armed engagement.142
B. Military Information Support Operations (MISO). Formerly known as psychological operations (PSYOP), MISO are lawful. In the 1991 Gulf War, U.S. PSYOP units distributed over 29 million leaflets to Iraqi forces. The themes of the leaflets were the “futility of resistance; inevitability of defeat; surrender; desertion and defection; abandonment of equipment; and blaming the war on Saddam Hussein.” It was estimated that nearly 98% of all Iraqi prisoners acknowledged having seen a leaflet; 88% said they believed the message; and 70% said the leaflets affected their decision to surrender.143
C. Treachery and Perfidy. Treachery and perfidy are prohibited under the LOAC.144 The HR forbid killing or wounding treacherously individuals belonging to the hostile nation or armed forces.145 Perfidy involves injuring the enemy by his adherence to the LOAC (actions are in bad faith). Perfidy degrades the protections and mutual restraints developed in the interest of all Parties, combatants, and civilians. In practice, combatants find it difficult to respect protected persons and objects if experience causes them to believe or suspect that the adversaries are abusing their claim to protection under the LOAC to gain a military advantage.146
1. Feigning and Misuse. Feigning is treachery that results in killing, wounding, or capture of the enemy. Misuse is an act of treachery resulting in some other advantage to the enemy. According to AP I, Article 37(1), the

134 RICK ATKINSON, CRUSADE 331-33 (1993).
135 For detailed discussion of uniform requirements for U.S. forces, see W. Hays Parks, Special Forces’ Wear of Non-Standard Uniforms, 44 CHI. J. INT’L L. 494 (2003).
136 GC III, art. 93.
137 FM 27-10, paras. 54, 74; NWP 1-14M, para. 12.5.3; U.S. DEP’T OF THE AIR FORCE, AIR FORCE PAMPHLET 110-31, THE CONDUCT OF ARMED CONFLICT AND AIR OPERATIONS (Nov. 1976), paras. 8-6.
138 Hague IV, art. 23(f).
139 FM 27-10, para. 54; NWP 1-14M, para 12.5. AP I, article 39(2) outlaws such use, but the United States objects to this term.
140 Hague IV, art. 53.
141 AP I, art. 39(3).
142 NWP 1-14M, paras. 12.3.1 & 12.5.1.
143 See R. B. Adolph, PSYOP: The Gulf War Force Multiplier, Army Magazine 16 (Dec. 1992).
144 Hague IV. art. 23(b).
145 Id.
146 FM 27-10, para. 50.
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killing, wounding, or capture by “[a]cts inviting the confidence of an adversary to lead him to believe that he is entitled to, or is obliged to accord, protection under the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, with intent to betray that confidence [are perfidious, and thus prohibited acts]” as such. An act is perfidious only where the feigning of civilian status or other act is a proximate cause in the killing of enemy combatants. Perfidy was not made a grave breach in AP I, and the prohibition applies only in international armed conflict.
2. Other prohibited acts include:
a. Use of a flag of truce to gain time for retreats or reinforcements.147
b. Feigning incapacitation by wounds/sickness.148
c. Feigning surrender or the intent to negotiate under a flag of truce.149
d. Misuse of the Red Cross, Red Crescent, Red Crystal and cultural property symbols. This provision is designed to reinforce/reaffirm the protections those symbols provide.150 GC I requires that military wounded and sick, military medical personnel (including chaplains), hospitals, medical vehicles, and in some cases, medical aircraft be respected and protected from intentional attack.
e. Declaring that no quarter will be given or killing/injuring enemy personnel who surrender.151
f. Compelling nationals of the enemy state to take part in hostilities against their own country.152
D. Espionage.153 Espionage involves clandestine action (under false pretenses) to obtain information for transmission back to one’s own side. Gathering intelligence while in uniform is not espionage. Espionage is not a LOAC violation; however, the Geneva Conventions do not protect acts of espionage. If captured, a spy may be tried under the laws of the capturing nation.154 Reaching friendly lines immunizes the spy for past espionage activities; therefore, upon later capture as a lawful combatant, the alleged “spy” cannot be tried for past espionage.
E. Assassination. Hiring assassins, putting a price on the enemy’s head, and offering rewards for an enemy “dead or alive” are prohibited as treacherous conduct.155 Offering rewards for information leading to capture of an individual, or attacking military command and control or personnel is not assassination, nor prohibited.156
F. Reprisals. Reprisals are conduct which otherwise would be unlawful, resorted to by one belligerent against enemy personnel or property in response to acts of warfare committed by the other belligerent in violation of the LOAC, for the sole purpose of enforcing future compliance with the LOAC.157 Individual U.S. military personnel, commanders and units do not have the authority to conduct a reprisal. That authority is retained at the national level.
G. War Trophies/Souvenirs. The LOAC authorizes the confiscation of enemy military property. War trophies or souvenirs taken from enemy military property are legal under the LOAC. War trophy personal retention by an individual soldier is restricted under U.S. domestic law. Confiscated enemy military property is property of the United States. The property becomes a war trophy, and capable of legal retention by an individual Soldier as a souvenir, only as authorized by higher authority. Pillage, that is, the unauthorized taking of private or personal property for personal gain or use, is expressly prohibited.158
1. War Trophy Policy. 10 U.S.C. § 2579 requires that all enemy material captured or found abandoned shall be turned in to “appropriate” personnel. The law, which directs the promulgation of an implementing directive and service regulations, contemplates that members of the armed forces may request enemy items as souvenirs. The request would be reviewed by an officer who shall act on the request “consistent with military customs, traditions,

147 Hague IV, art 23(f).
148 AP I, art. 37(1)(b).
149 AP I, art 37(1)(a).
150 Hague IV, art. 23(f).
151 Hague IV, art. 23.
152 Id.
153 FM 27-10, para. 75; AP I, art. 46.
154 See UCMJ art. 106.
155 FM 27-10, para 31; E.O. 12333.
156 See W. Hays Parks, Memorandum of Law: Executive Order 12333 and Assassination, ARMY LAW, Dec. 1989, at 4.
157 FM 27-10, para. 49.
158 Hague IV, art. 47; GC I, art. 15; GC II, art. 18; GC IV, art. 33.

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and regulations.” The law authorizes the retention of captured weapons as souvenirs if rendered unserviceable and approved jointly by DoD and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (BATF). Implementing directives have not been promulgated.159
2. Guidance. USCENTCOM General Order Number 1 is an example of a war trophy order. These regulations and policies, and relevant provisions of the UCMJ which may be used to enforce those regulations and policies, must be made known to U.S. forces prior to combat. War trophy regulations must be emphasized early and often, for even those who are aware of the regulations may be tempted to disregard them if they see others doing so.
a. An 11 February 2004 Deputy Secretary of Defense memorandum establishes interim guidance on the collection of war souvenirs for the duration of OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) and will remain in effect until an updated DoD Directive is implemented. This memorandum provides the following:
(1) War souvenirs shall be permitted by this interim guidance only if they are acquired and retained in accordance with the LOAC obligations of the United States. Law of armed conflict violations should be prevented and, if committed by U.S. persons, promptly reported, thoroughly investigated, and, where appropriate, remedied by corrective action.
(2) All U.S. military personnel and civilians subject to this policy, operating in the Iraqi theater of operations during OIF shall turn over to officials designated by CDRUSCENTCOM all captured, found abandoned, or otherwise acquired material, and may not, except in accordance with this interim guidance, take from the Iraqi theater of operations as a souvenir any item captured, found abandoned, or otherwise acquired.
(3) An individual who desires to retain as a war souvenir an item acquired in the Iraqi theater of operations shall request to have the item returned to them as a war souvenir at the time it is turned over to persons designated by CDRUSCENTCOM. Such a request shall be in writing, identify the item, and explain how it was acquired.
(4) The guidance defines “War Souvenir” as any item of enemy public or private property utilized as war material (i.e., military accouterments) acquired in the Iraqi area of operations during OIF and authorized to be retained by an individual pursuant to this memorandum. War souvenirs are limited to the following items: (1) helmets and head coverings; (2) uniforms and uniform items such as insignia and patches; (3) canteens, compasses, rucksacks, pouches, and load-bearing equipment; (4) flags (not otherwise prohibited by 10 U.S.C. 4714 and 7216); (5) knives or bayonets, other than those defined as weaponry [in paragraph 3 below]; (6) military training manuals, books, and pamphlets; (7) posters, placards, and photographs; (8) currency of the former regime; or (9) other similar items that clearly pose no safety or health risk, and are not otherwise prohibited by law or regulation. Under this interim guidance, a war souvenir does not include weaponry.
(5) Acquired. A war souvenir is acquired if it is captured, found abandoned, or obtained by any other lawful means. “Abandoned” for purposes of this interim guidance means property left behind by the enemy.
(6) Weaponry. For this guidance, weaponry includes, but is not limited to: weapons; weapons systems; firearms; ammunition; cartridge casings (“brass”); explosives of any type; switchblade knives; knives with an automatic blade opener including knives in which the blade snaps forth from the grip (a) on pressing a button or lever or on releasing a catch with which the blade can be locked (spring knife), (b) by weight or by swinging motion and is locked automatically (gravity knife), or (c) by any operation, alone or in combination, of gravity or spring mechanism and can be locked; club-type hand weapons (for example, blackjacks, brass knuckles, nunchaku); and blades that are (a) particularly equipped to be collapsed, telescoped or shortened, (b) stripped beyond the normal extent required for hunting or sporting, or (c) concealed in other devices (for example, walking sticks, umbrellas, tubes). This definition applies whether an item is, in whole or in part, militarized or demilitarized, standing alone or incorporated into other items (e.g., plaques or frames).
(7) Prohibited Items. For the purposes of this interim guidance, prohibited items include weaponry and personal items belonging to enemy combatants or civilians including, but not limited to: letters, family pictures, identification cards, and “dog tags.”

159 The Marine Corps still lists as active Marine Corps Order (MCO) 5800.6A dtd 28 Aug. 1969 (Personal Affairs Control and Registration of War Trophies and War Trophy Firearms). This is a joint order (AR 608–4; OPNAVINST 3460.7A, and AFR 125–13).
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d. Legal Position: In addition to the strategies and initiatives discussed above, two recent unclassified statements of U.S. policy stand out regarding cyberspace: a 2011 DoD report to Congress on cyberspace policy,458 and a 2012 speech459 by then-U.S. Department of State Legal Advisor Harold Koh at a U.S. Cyber Command legal conference. Both references make clear that the United States accepts the application of established international law of armed conflict legal authorities to CO, though the precise function of some rules remains to be worked out.
e. Joint Doctrine: Recent joint doctrine rewrites formally separated CO from IO. Joint Pub. 3-13 deletes the term computer network operations (CNO) and its three subcategories of attack (CNA), defense (CND), and exploitation (CNE) from joint doctrine.460 The new classified Joint Pub. 3-12, Cyberspace Operations, sets forth a comprehensive doctrinal framework for CO.461 Unclassified definitions of key terms appear in Joint Pub. 1-02:
• Cyberspace: “A global domain within the information environment consisting of the interdependent network of information technology infrastructures and resident data, including the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers.”462
• Cyberspace superiority: “The degree of dominance in cyberspace by one force that permits the secure, reliable conduct of operations by that force, and its related land, air, maritime, and space forces at a given time and place without prohibitive interference by an adversary.”463
• Offensive cyberspace operations (OCO): “Cyberspace operations intended to project power by the application of force in or through cyberspace.”464
• Defensive cyberspace operations (DCO): “Passive and active cyberspace operations intended to preserve the ability to utilize friendly cyberspace capabilities and protect data, networks, net-centric capabilities, and other designated systems.”465
• Defensive cyberspace operation response action (DCO-RA): Deliberate, authorized defensive measures or activities taken outside of the defended network to protect and defend Department of Defense cyberspace capabilities or other designated systems.”466 (emphasis added)
• Department of Defense information networks (DODIN): “The globally interconnected, end-to-end set of information capabilities, and associated processes for collecting, processing, storing, disseminating, and managing information on-demand to warfighters, policy makers, and support personnel, including owned and leased communications and computing systems and services, software (including applications), data, and security.”467
• Department of Defense information network (DODIN) operations: “Operations to design, build, configure, secure, operate, maintain, and sustain [DoD] networks to create and preserve information assurance on the [DoD] information networks.”468
1. Relation to IO: Joint Pub. 3-13 states—
CO are the employment of cyberspace capabilities where the primary purpose is to achieve objectives in or through cyberspace. Cyberspace capabilities, when in support of IO, deny or

458 U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., CYBERSPACE POLICY REPORT: A REPORT TO CONGRESS PURSUANT TO THE NATIONAL DEFENSE
AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2011, SECTION 934 (Nov. 2011)(answering thirteen questions for Congress on DoD’s cyber policies and legal positions—one of the best quick primers for military legal advisors on cyberspace).
459 Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep’t of State, International Law in Cyberspace: Remarks as Prepared for Delivery by Harold Hongju Koh to the USCYBERCOM Inter-Agency Legal Conference Ft. Meade, MD, Sept. 18, 2012, 54 HARV. INT'L
L.J. ONLINE 1 (Dec. 2012)(footnoted version of original remarks, with citations to supporting sources).
460 See JOINT PUB. 3-13, supra note 1, at GL-3 (deleting terms); see generally JOINT PUB. 3-12, supra note 69.
461 See generally JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-12, CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS (5 Feb. 2013)(Classified Secret) [hereinafter JOINT PUB. 3-12].
462 See JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 1-02, DICTIONARY OF MILITARY AND ASSOCIATED TERMS at 70 (8 Nov. 2010)(as
amended through 15 Apr. 2013) [hereinafter JOINT PUB. 1-02] (citing JOINT PUB. 3-12).
463 Id. at 70 (citing JOINT PUB. 3-12). JP 1-02 prefers the adjective ‘cyberspace’ to ‘cyber.’ Id. at B-4.
464 Id. at 204 (citing JOINT PUB. 3-12).
465 Id. at 76 (citing JOINT PUB. 3-12).
466 Id. at 75 (citing JOINT PUB. 3-12).
467 Id. at 78 (citing JOINT PUB. 3-12). JP 1-02 prefers this term over ‘Global Information Grid.’ Id. at B-4.
468 Id. at 78 (citing JOINT PUB. 3-12).
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Information Operations and Cyberspace Operations

manipulate adversary or potential adversary decision making, through targeting an information medium (such as a wireless access point in the physical dimension), the message itself (an encrypted message in the information dimension), or a cyber-persona (an online identity that facilitates communication, decision making, and the influencing of audiences in the cognitive dimension). When employed in support of IO, CO generally focus on the integration of offensive and defensive capabilities exercised in and through cyberspace, in concert with other IRCs, and coordination across multiple lines of operation and lines of effort.469
g. Common Legal Issues: U.N. Charter (jus ad bellum analysis whether a cyberspace act constitutes a threat or use of force under Article 2(4), or an armed attack under Article 51 that justifies actions in self-defense); Law of Armed Conflict (jus in bello compliance with treaties and customary norms governing weapons, tactics, targeting, and protection of civilians and civilian property); Neutrality Law (including both a sovereign nation’s right to remain neutral in armed conflicts and its obligation to prevent use of its territory to stage attacks); Communications Law (requiring, in peacetime, non-interference with certain state infrastructures and broadcasts); Intelligence, Privacy, and Free Speech Laws (primarily domestic, restricting the state’s use of certain methods, targets, or actors to gather information and preserving freedom of expression); Criminal Law (prohibiting certain activities in cyberspace and encouraging state cooperation in prosecuting hackers); and National Security Law (protection of critical infrastructure and assets, including cooperation with other agencies and private entities). Coordination and deconfliction with other domestic authorities governing use of related capabilities is also critical.
h. Proponents: DoD Chief Information Officer (CIO);470 U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), including its sub-unified command, U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM, whose Commander is dual-hatted as Director of the National Security Agency) and four component cyber commands: U.S. Army Cyber Command (ARCYBER), U.S. 2d Army; U.S. Fleet Cyber Command, U.S. 10th Fleet; U.S. Marine Corps Force Cyberspace Command (MARFORCYBER); U.S. Air Force Cyber Command (AFCYBER), 24th Air Force; the National Security Agency and Central Security Service (NSA/CSS); and other agencies as appropriate to their particular missions and capabilities.
i. Operational Guidance: No specific annex is currently dedicated to CO, though Annex K, Communication Systems, may discuss aspects of CO.
j. Sources: The recently-codified 10 U.S.C. § 111 note on “Military Activities in Cyberspace” recognizes DoD’s capability to conduct offensive operations in cyberspace, as directed by the President. 471 It requires that CO comply with the same policy and legal authorities applicable to kinetic capabilities, and with the War Powers Resolution. In practice, this requires legal review of both capabilities (analogous to weapons reviews under the law of armed conflict) and training of forces on the appropriate use of those capabilities. In addition to those sources and areas of law cited above, the following authorities also apply to cyberspace: Executive and DoD orders, directives, and instructions on protecting critical functions,472 infrastructure,473 and networks;474 DoD policy

469 JOINT PUB. 3-13, supra note 1, at II-9.
470 See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DIR. 5144.02, DOD CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER (DOD CIO) (22 Apr. 2013).
471 Added by National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. 12–81, div. A, title IX, § 954 (Dec. 31, 2011) (2012 Supp.),125 Stat. 1551. The codified note states in full:
Congress affirms that the Department of Defense has the capability, and upon direction by the President may conduct offensive operations in cyberspace to defend our Nation, Allies and interests, subject to—
(1) the policy principles and legal regimes that the Department follows for kinetic capabilities, including the law of armed conflict; and
(2) the War Powers Resolution (50 U.S.C. 1541 et seq.).
Id.; see also H.R. Rep. No. 112-329 pt. 1, at 686 (Dec. 12, 2011)(Conference Report discussion of § 954’s purpose).
472 See, e.g., DEP’T OF DEF., INSTR. 5200.44, PROTECTION OF MISSION CRITICAL FUNCTIONS TO ACHIEVE TRUSTED SYSTEMS AND
NETWORKS (5 Nov. 2012).
473 See, e.g., Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA), 44 U.S.C. § 3541 et seq. (2006); THE WHITE HOUSE, PRESIDENTIAL POLICY DIRECTIVE [21] -- CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY AND RESILIENCE (Feb. 12, 2013); EXEC. ORDER. NO. 13,636, FEB. 12, 2013, IMPROVING CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE CYBERSECURITY, 78 F.R. 11739 (Feb 19, 2013); DEP’T OF DEF.,
DIR. 3020.40, DOD POLICIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOR CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE (14 Jan. 2010) (C2, 21 Sep. 2012); DEP’T OF
DEF., INSTR. 3020.45, DEFENSE CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROGRAM (DCIP) MANAGEMENT (21 Apr. 2008).
474 See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DIR. 8000.01, MANAGEMENT OF THE [DOD] INFORMATION ENTERPRISE (10 Feb. 2009); U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DIR. O-8530.1, COMPUTER NETWORK DEFENSE (CND) (8 Jan. 2001)(U//FOUO); U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., INSTR. O­8530.2, SUPPORT TO COMPUTER NETWORK DEFENSE (CND) (9 Mar. 2001)(U//FOUO); U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., INSTR. 8410.02, NETOPS FOR THE GLOBAL INFORMATION GRID (GIG) (19 Dec. 2008); U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., INSTR. 8410.03, NETWORK
141 chapter 8
Information operations and cyberspace operations

D. Undefended places. The attack or bombardment of towns or villages, which are undefended, is prohibited.91
3. An inhabited place may be declared an undefended place (and open for occupation) if the following criteria are met:
a. All combatants and mobile military equipment are removed;
b. No hostile use is made of fixed military installations or establishments;
c. No acts of hostilities shall be committed by the authorities or by the population; and
d. No activities in support of military operations shall be undertaken (the presence of enemy medical units, enemy sick and wounded, and enemy police forces are allowed).92
4. While the HR, Article 25, prohibits attacking undefended “habitations or buildings,” the term was used in the context of intentional bombardment. Given the definition of military objective, such structures remain civilian objects and immune from intentional attack unless (a) used by the enemy for military purposes, and (b) destruction, capture, or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.
5. To gain protection as an undefended place, a city or town must be open to physical occupation by ground forces of the adverse party.
A. Protected Areas. Hospital or safety zones may be established for the protection of the wounded and sick or civilians.93 Such hospital or safety zones require agreement of the Parties to the conflict. Articles 8 and 11 of the Hague Cultural Property Convention allows certain cultural sites to be designated in an “International Register of Cultural Property under Special Protections.” For example, the Vatican has qualified for and been registered as “specially protected.” Special Protection status requires strict adherence to avoidance of any military use of the property or the area in its immediate vicinity, such as movement of military personnel or materiel, even in transit.
B. Protected Individuals and Property.
6. Civilians. As discussed above, individual civilians, the civilian population as such, and civilian objects are protected from intentional attack.94 A presumption of civilian property attaches to objects traditionally associated with civilian use (dwellings, school, etc.95) as contrasted with military objectives. The presence of civilians in a military objective does not alter its status as a military objective.
7. Medical Units and Establishments; Hospitals.96 Fixed or mobile medical units shall be respected and protected. They shall not be intentionally attacked. Protection shall not cease, unless they are used to commit “acts harmful to the enemy.”97 A warning is required before attacking a hospital in which individuals are committing “acts harmful to the enemy.” The hospital must be given a reasonable time to comply with the warning before an attack.98 When receiving fire from a hospital, there is no duty to warn before returning fire in self-defense. Example: Richmond Hills Hospital, Grenada.
8. Captured Medical Facilities and Supplies of the Armed Forces.99 Fixed facilities should be used for the care of the wounded and sick, but they may be used by captors for other than medical care, in cases of urgent military necessity, provided proper arrangements are made for the wounded and sick who are present. Captors may keep mobile medical facilities, provided they are reserved for care of the wounded and sick. Medical Supplies may not be destroyed.
9. Medical Transport. Transports of the wounded and sick or of medical equipment shall not be attacked.100 Under GC I, article 36, medical aircraft are protected from direct attack only if they fly in accordance

91 Hague IV, art. 25.
92 FM 27-10, para. 39b.
93 GC I, art. 23; GC IV, art. 14.
94 FM 27-10, para. 246; AP I, art. 51, para. 2.
95 AP I, art. 52(3).
96 FM 27-10, paras. 257- 58; GC I, art. 19.; GC IV, arts. 18 & 19.
97 GC I, art. 21.
98 AP I, art. 13.
99 FM 27-10, para. 234.
100 GC I, art. 35.
Chapter 2 24
The Law of Armed Conflict

with a previous agreement between the parties as to their route, time, and altitude. AP I contains a new regime for medical aircraft protection.101 To date, there is no State practice with respect to implementation of this regime. As the United States is not a State Party to AP I, it continues to apply the criteria for protection contained in GC I, Article 36. The Distinctive Emblem and other devices set forth in the Amended Annex I to AP I are to facilitate identification, but they do not establish status. However, it is U.S. policy that known medical aircraft shall be respected and protected when performing their humanitarian functions.
5. Cultural Property.102 The Hague Cultural Property Convention prohibits targeting cultural property, and sets forth conditions when cultural property may be used by a defender or attacked. Although the United States did not ratify the treaty until 2008, it has always regarded the treaty’s provisions as relevant to the targeting process: “United States policy and the conduct of operations are entirely consistent with the Convention’s provisions. In large measure, the practices required by the convention to protect cultural property were based upon the practices of
U.S. military forces during World War II.”103 Cultural property is protected from intentional attack so long as it is not being used for military purposes, or otherwise may be regarded as a military objective. The Convention defines cultural property as “movable or immovable property of great importance to the cultural heritage of every people.” Cultural property includes inter alia buildings dedicated to religion, art, and historic monuments. Misuse will subject such property to attack. While the enemy has a duty to indicate the presence of such buildings with visible and distinctive signs, state adherence to the marking requirement has been limited. U.S. practice has been to rely on its intelligence collection to identify such objects in order to avoid attacking or damaging them.
G. Works and Installations Containing Dangerous Forces.104 These rules are not United States law but should be considered because of pervasive international acceptance of AP I and II. Under the Protocol, dams, dikes, and nuclear electrical generating stations shall not be attacked (even if military objectives) if the attack will cause the release of dangerous forces and cause “severe losses” among the civilian population. Military objectives near these potentially dangerous forces are also immune from attack if the attack may cause release of the dangerous forces (parties also have a duty to avoid locating military objectives near such locations). Works and installations containing dangerous forces may be attacked only if they provide “significant and direct support” to military operations, attack is the only feasible way to terminate support, and only after scrutinizing the attack under the principle of proportionality
H. Objects Indispensable to the Survival of the Civilian Population. Article 54 of AP I prohibits starvation as a method of warfare. It is prohibited to attack, destroy, remove, or render useless objects indispensable for survival of the civilian population, such as foodstuffs, crops, livestock, water installations, and irrigation works. The United States rejects, however, broad prohibitions on attacking such objects when used to support enemy forces.
I. Protective Emblems.105 Objects and personnel displaying certain protective emblems are presumed to be protected under the Conventions.106
1. Medical and Religious Emblems. The recognized emblems are the Red Cross, Red Crescent, and the newly-ratified Red Crystal.107 The Red Lion and Sun, though protected by GC I, is no longer used. Also, the Red Star of David was proposed as an additional emblem, and, while never officially recognized by treaty, was protected as a matter of practice during the periods it was used.
2. Cultural Property Emblems. Cultural property is marked with “[a] shield, consisting of a royal blue square, one of the angles of which forms the point of the shield and of a royal blue triangle above the square, the space on either side being taken up by a white triangle.”108 Examples of cultural property include museums, ancient ruins, and monuments with historical significance.

101 AP I, arts. 24-31.
102 See generally 1954 Cultural Property Convention.
103 President William J. Clinton, Message to the Senate Transmitting the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict (Jan. 6, 1999).
104 AP I, art. 56; AP II, art. 15.
105 FM 27-10, para. 238.
106 GC I, art. 38.

107 AP III.
108 1954 Cultural Property Convention, arts. 16, 17.

25 Chapter 2
The Law of Armed Conflict

Appendix A. Modern NLW Technology

The Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate (JNLWD) at Marine Corps Base Quantico, Virginia, is the DoD’s Joint Non- Lethal Weapons Program Executive Agent and coordinates the research, development, testing, and evaluation of NLWs.91 The individual services also maintain NLW programs. The Army’s proponent for NLWs is the Nonlethal Scalable Effects Center, United States Army Military Police School, at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri.92

This article does not cover the entire range of NLW technology in use or in development, but will provide a brief overview of a few of the weapons currently being fielded or developed by the DoD.

A. Fielded NLW technology.
The DoD has a variety of NLW technology currently available for use across a broad range of operations, from convoy and checkpoint operations, to vessel boarding and crowd control.93 Many of these weapons have been in use for a number of years, in both military operations and domestic policing contexts.94
1. Optical Distraction Devices
These devices, also known as dazzling lasers, are lasers with reversible effects that are generally used to disorient and warn or dissuade drivers or pedestrians from approaching a unit position too closely, with a range of over 150 meters in the day and over 2000 meters at night.95

2. Flash Bang Munitions
Designed as counter-personnel munitions, flash bang weapons, such as the M84 Flash Bang Grenade, deliver a bright flash and loud bang, combining optical and acoustic effects, to disorient and suppress personnel in a variety of circumstances, such as checkpoints, crowd control, and building clearing operations.96

3. Modular Crowd Control Munition (MCCM)

The MCCM looks similar to the venerable (and lethal) M18 Claymore mine, but delivers non-lethal blunt force trauma in the form of 600 rubber balls projected at high speed to a range of almost twenty meters. The MCCM is designed for use at entry control points, defensive actions, and crowd control.97 Similar to the MCCM, is the Stingball Grenade, which can be hand thrown or launched from a modified 12-gauge shotgun to a range of approximately seventy meters. It also uses rubber pellets to suppress personnel and can be used for force protection, crowd control, and room clearing in urban operations.98

4. M1006 40mm Non-Lethal Point Round

The Army currently uses the M1006, or Sponge Grenade, is fired from the M203 Grenade Launcher and is intended to deliver blunt force trauma to adults at ranges from ten to fifty meters. According to the Army’s project manager for the M1006, this

91 Non-Lethal Weapons Program, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, http://jnlwp.defense.gov/About/Organization.aspx (last visited Jan. 18, 2016).
92 ARMY NONLETHAL SCALABLE EFFECTS CENTER, UNITED STATES ARMY MILITARY POLICE SCHOOL, http://www.wood.army.mil/usamps/Organizations/Nonlethal/Nonlethal.html (last visited Jan. 18, 2016).
93 U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., JOINT NON-LETHAL WEAPONS DIRECTORATE, NON-LETHAL WEAPONS REFERENCE BOOK (2012).
94 DAVID A. KOPLOW, NON-LETHAL WEAPONS: THE LAW AND POLICY OF REVOLUTIONARY TECHNOLOGIES FOR THE MILITARY AND LAW ENFORCEMENT 10 (2006)
95 DOD NON-LETHAL WEAPONS PROGRAM, OVERVIEW BRIEF AND INFORMATION EXCHANGE (Jan. 15, 2015), http://jnlwp.defense.gov/Portals/50/Documents/Resources/Presentations/Ov... [hereinafter DoD NLW Brief].
96 NON-LETHAL WEAPONS PROGRAM, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, M-84 FLASH BANG GRENADE, http://jnlwp.defense.gov/CurrentNonLethalWeapons/M84FlashBangGrenade.aspx (last visited Jan. 19, 2016).
97 NON-LETHAL WEAPONS PROGRAM, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, MODULAR CROWD CONTROL MUNITION, http://jnlwp.defense.gov/CurrentNonLethalWeapons/ModularCrowdControlMuni... (last visited Jan. 19, 2016).
98 NON-LETHAL WEAPONS PROGRAM, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, STINGBALL GRENADE, http://jnlwp.defense.gov/CurrentNonLethalWeapons/StingballGrenade.aspx (last visited Jan 19, 2016).

NLW can be used in a variety of situations, including crowd control, convoy protection, and use against individual threats by stunning them to enable safe detention.99
B. Developing NLW Technology

1. Active Denial System (ADS)
The ADS is a vehicle mounted system designed to utilize millimeter waves (often incorrectly referred to as “microwave”) to cause a rapid and intense heating sensation on anyone in the ADS beam’s path, at ranges out to 1000 meters. Subjects exposed to the ADS beam quickly move away from the source of the beam to avoid continued exposure. The heating effect only penetrates the skin to depths of about 1/64 inch and does not alter the cellular structure of the skin, therefore causing no burn injuries on those exposed to the millimeter beam.100 The ADS is designed to be used for force protection, convoy operations, crowd control, and offensive and defensive operations, among others.101
2. Mission Payload Module—Non-lethal Weapons System (MPM-NLWS)
The MPM-NLWS is a vehicle-mounted multiple tube launcher that can deliver flash bang non-lethal munitions at ranges up to 500 meters and also transition to lethal munitions if necessary. As with other NLW, it is designed for force protection, as well as force application.102
These is just a portion of the NLW technology currently being used or developed by the DoD. Others, including the Distributed Sound and Light Array (DLSA), providing acoustic and visual hailing capabilities, and Portable Vehicle Arresting Barrier, which can stop moving civilian vehicles, are also in use by the DoD.103 Clearly, there is a significant desire, if not need, by the DoD to have a wide array of NLWs at its disposal. Moreover, there is no indication that the need will remain static in the near future.104

99 PROJECT MANAGER CLOSE COMBAT SYSTEMS, PD COMBAT MUNITIONS, M1006 40MM NON-LETHAL POINT ROUND, http://www.pica.army.mil/pmccs/combatmunitions/nonlethalsys/nonlethalcap... 4nlc_41.htm (last visited Jan. 19, 2016).
100 Susan LeVine, The Active Denial System: A Revolutionary Non-lethal Weapon for Today’s Battlefield (June 2009), CTR. TECH. & NAT’L SECURITY POL’Y, http://ctnsp.dodlive.mil/files/2013/07/DTP-065.pdf.
101 NON-LETHAL WEAPONS PROGRAM, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, ACTIVE DENIAL TECHNOLOGY, http://jnlwp.defense.gov/FutureNonLethalWeapons/ActiveDenialTechnology.aspx (last visited Jan. 19, 2016).
102 DoD NLW Brief, supra note 95.
103 Id.
104 Susan D. LeVine & Joseph A. Rutigliano Jr., U.S. Military Use of Non-Lethal Weapons: Reality vs Perceptions, 47 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 239, 246 (2015).

NON-LETHAL WEAPONS AND THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT MINIMIZING CIVILIAN CASUALTIES ON TE BATTLEFIELD BY MARK GARDNER
OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK INTERNATIONAL AND OPERATIONAL LAW DEPT THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL LEGAL CENTER SCHOOL U.S. ARMY CHARLOTTESVILLE VIRGINIA 2013
TODAY IS DEC 24 2018

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