EDUCATIONAL

HAND-OUT

ON

MALICIOUS

HARASSMENT

AND

MALICIOUS

ACT LAWS

RCW 9a.36.080
Malicious harassment—Definition and criminal penalty.
(1) A person is guilty of malicious harassment if he or she maliciously and intentionally commits one of the following acts because of his or her perception of the victim's race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, or mental, physical, or sensory handicap:
(a) Causes physical injury to the victim or another person;
(b) Causes physical damage to or destruction of the property of the victim or another person; or
(c) Threatens a specific person or group of persons and places that person, or members of the specific group of persons, in reasonable fear of harm to person or property. The fear must be a fear that a reasonable person would have under all the circumstances. For purposes of this section, a "reasonable person" is a reasonable person who is a member of the victim's race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, gender, or sexual orientation, or who has the same mental, physical, or sensory handicap as the victim. Words alone do not constitute malicious harassment unless the context or circumstances surrounding the words indicate the words are a threat. Threatening words do not constitute malicious harassment if it is apparent to the victim that the person does not have the ability to carry out the threat.
(2) In any prosecution for malicious harassment, unless evidence exists which explains to the trier of fact's satisfaction that the person did not intend to threaten the victim or victims, the trier of fact may infer that the person intended to threaten a specific victim or group of victims because of the person's perception of the victim's or victims' race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, or mental, physical, or sensory handicap if the person commits one of the following acts:
(a) Burns a cross on property of a victim who is or whom the actor perceives to be of African American heritage; or
(b) Defaces property of a victim who is or whom the actor perceives to be of Jewish heritage by defacing the property with a swastika.
This subsection only applies to the creation of a reasonable inference for evidentiary purposes. This subsection does not restrict the state's ability to prosecute a person under subsection (1) of this section when the facts of a particular case do not fall within (a) or (b) of this subsection.
(3) It is not a defense that the accused was mistaken that the victim was a member of a certain race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, gender, or sexual orientation, or had a mental, physical, or sensory handicap.
(4) Evidence of expressions or associations of the accused may not be introduced as substantive evidence at trial unless the evidence specifically relates to the crime charged. Nothing in this chapter shall affect the rules of evidence governing impeachment of a witness.
(5) Every person who commits another crime during the commission of a crime under this section may be punished and prosecuted for the other crime separately.
(6) For the purposes of this section:
(a) "Sexual orientation" has the same meaning as in RCW 49.60.040.
(b) "Threat" means to communicate, directly or indirectly, the intent to:
(i) Cause bodily injury immediately or in the future to the person threatened or to any other person; or
(ii) Cause physical damage immediately or in the future to the property of a person threatened or that of any other person.
(7) Malicious harassment is a class C felony.
(8) The penalties provided in this section for malicious harassment do not preclude the victims from seeking any other remedies otherwise available under law.
(9) Nothing in this section confers or expands any civil rights or protections to any group or class identified under this section, beyond those rights or protections that exist under the federal or state Constitution or the civil laws of the state of Washington.
[ 2010 c 119 § 1; 2009 c 180 § 1; 1993 c 127 § 2; 1989 c 95 § 1; 1984 c 268 § 1; 1981 c 267 § 1.]
NOTES:
Severability—1993 c 127: See note following RCW 9A.36.078.
Construction—1989 c 95: "The provisions of this act shall be liberally construed in order to effectuate its purpose." [ 1989 c 95 § 3.]
Severability—1989 c 95: "If any provision of this act or its application to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the remainder of the act or the application of the provision to other persons or circumstances is not affected." [ 1989 c 95 § 4.]Harassment: Chapters 9A.46 and 10.14 RCW.

Term for malicious act

What is a “Malicious Act”: Two minors drowned at a beach owned and operated by the City of Kenosha. At the time of the incident, the beach was staffed by four lifeguards employed and trained by the City. The City hired the lifeguards without formal interviews or skills testing and had not provided the lifeguards with any first-aid or rescue training prior to the incident. The parents sued the City and alleged, among other things, that the City was negligent in failing to properly train and instruct its lifeguards. In doing so, they argued that the City was not entitled to recreational immunity under Wis. Stat. § 895.52 because the conduct qualified as malicious. The Wisconsin Supreme Court, however, ruled that the conduct did not qualify as a malicious act because there was “no evidence that the deaths were the result of hatred, ill-will, a desire for revenge or inflicted under the circumstances where insult or injury was intended.” Ervin v. City of Kenosha, 159 Wis.2d 464, 464 N.W.2d 654 (1991).

Malicious Law and Legal Definition. Malicious means substantially certain to cause injury, being deliberately harmful or spiteful, without just cause or excuse. ... A malicious act is an intentional, wrongful act performed against another without legal justification or excuse.

Malicious. Involving malice; characterized by wicked or mischievous motives or intentions. An act done maliciously is one that is wrongful and performed willfully or intentionally, and without legal justification.

Malicious damage is an act that intentionally or deliberately causes damage to personal, private or commercial property. Examples of malicious damage include vandalism and graffiti. Although... ... the offense. Learn more about Law. Sources:.

Malicious damage is an act that intentionally or deliberately causes damage to personal, private or commercial property. Examples of malicious damage include vandalism and graffiti. Although malicious damage is a minor offense, there are severe penalties for acts associated with this offense.

What is an abuse of process?
Abuse of process is a cause of action in tort arising from one party making a malicious and deliberate misuse or perversion of regularly issued court process (civil or criminal) not justified by the underlying legal action. It is a common laWhat is aforethought?
malice aforethought. n. 1) the conscious intent to cause death or great bodily harm to another person before a person commits the crime. Such malice is a required element to prove first degree murder. 2) a general evil and depraved state of mind in which the person is unconcerned for the lives of others.
What are the elements of malicious prosecution?
Malicious prosecution is a common law intentional tort, while like the tort of abuse of process, its elements include (1) intentionally (and maliciously) instituting and pursuing (or causing to be instituted or pursued) a legal action (civil or criminal) that is (2) brought without probable cause and (3) dismissed in ...
Constructive malice was the doctrine that malice aforethought, the mental element for murder, could be attributed to the defendant if death was caused during the commission of another felony (such as robbery or burglary).

Malicious is the adjective based on the noun malice, which means the desire to harm others. Both words come from the Latin word malus, for bad. If someone is malicious he doesn't just make bad things happen; he loves to make bad things happen.
Mens rea (/ˈmɛnz ˈriːə/; Latin for "guilty mind"[1][ the act is not culpable unless the mind is guilty
actus reus ("guilty act") and mens rea for a defendant to be guilty of a crime

Scotland[edit]
• Intention: the accused willingly committed a criminal act entirely aware of his actions and their consequences. Necessary for murder and for assault.
• Recklessness: the accused was aware the criminal act could be potentially dangerous but did not give a second thought to its consequences, for example involuntary culpable homicide.
• Negligence: the accused unintentionally committed the criminal act by accident for one reason or another. However this tends not to be a valid excuse.
United States[edit]
State criminal law[edit]
The vast majority of criminal prosecutions in the United States are carried out by the component states in accordance with the laws of the state in question. Historically, the states (with the partial exception of civil-law Louisiana) applied common law rules of mens rea similar to those extant in England, but over time American understandings of common law mens rea terms diverged from those of English law and from each other. By the late 1950s to early 1960s, the common law of mens rea was widely acknowledged to be a slippery, vague, and confused mess.[13] This was one of several factors that led to the development of the Model Penal Code.
Model Penal Code[edit]
Since its publication in 1957, the formulation of mens rea set forth in the Model Penal Code has been highly influential throughout North America in clarifying the discussion of the different modes of culpability.[13] The following levels of mens rea are found in the MPC:
• Strict liability: the actor engaged in conduct and his mental state is irrelevant. Under Model Penal Code Section 2.05, this mens rea may only be applied where the forbidden conduct is a mere violation, i.e. a civil infraction.
• Negligently: a "reasonable person" would be aware of a "substantial and unjustifiable risk" that his conduct is of a prohibited nature, will lead to a prohibited result, and/or is under prohibited attendant circumstances, and the actor was not so aware but should have been.
• Recklessly: the actor consciously disregards a "substantial and unjustifiable risk" that his conduct is of a prohibited nature, will lead to a prohibited result, and/or is of a prohibited nature.
• Knowingly: the actor is practically certain that his conduct will lead to the result, or is aware to a high probability that his conduct is of a prohibited nature, or is aware to a high probability that the attendant circumstances exist.
• Purposefully: the actor has the "conscious object" of engaging in conduct and believes or hopes that the attendant circumstances exist.
Except for strict liability, these classes of mens rea are defined in Section 2.02(2) of the MPC.
Federal criminal law[edit]
Since the federal government of the United States does not have a generalized police power like that of the states, the scope of its criminal statutes is necessarily circumscribed. Ordinary prosecutions are the province of the states, and only crimes of special federal import are pursued by the federal government. Consequently, Title 18 of the United States Code does not use the aforementioned culpability scheme but relies instead on more traditional definitions of crimes taken from common law. For example, malice aforethought is used as a requirement for committing capital murder.[14]
______________________________________________________________________

RCW 9A.36.080
Malicious harassment—Definition and criminal penalty.
(1) A person is guilty of malicious harassment if he or she maliciously and intentionally commits one of the following acts because of his or her perception of the victim's race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, or mental, physical, or sensory handicap:
(a) Causes physical injury to the victim or another person;
(b) Causes physical damage to or destruction of the property of the victim or another person; or
(c) Threatens a specific person or group of persons and places that person, or members of the specific group of persons, in reasonable fear of harm to person or property. The fear must be a fear that a reasonable person would have under all the circumstances. For purposes of this section, a "reasonable person" is a reasonable person who is a member of the victim's race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, gender, or sexual orientation, or who has the same mental, physical, or sensory handicap as the victim. Words alone do not constitute malicious harassment unless the context or circumstances surrounding the words indicate the words are a threat. Threatening words do not constitute malicious harassment if it is apparent to the victim that the person does not have the ability to carry out the threat.
(2) In any prosecution for malicious harassment, unless evidence exists which explains to the trier of fact's satisfaction that the person did not intend to threaten the victim or victims, the trier of fact may infer that the person intended to threaten a specific victim or group of victims because of the person's perception of the victim's or victims' race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, or mental, physical, or sensory handicap if the person commits one of the following acts:
(a) Burns a cross on property of a victim who is or whom the actor perceives to be of African American heritage; or
(b) Defaces property of a victim who is or whom the actor perceives to be of Jewish heritage by defacing the property with a swastika.
This subsection only applies to the creation of a reasonable inference for evidentiary purposes. This subsection does not restrict the state's ability to prosecute a person under subsection (1) of this section when the facts of a particular case do not fall within (a) or (b) of this subsection.
(3) It is not a defense that the accused was mistaken that the victim was a member of a certain race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, gender, or sexual orientation, or had a mental, physical, or sensory handicap.
(4) Evidence of expressions or associations of the accused may not be introduced as substantive evidence at trial unless the evidence specifically relates to the crime charged. Nothing in this chapter shall affect the rules of evidence governing impeachment of a witness.
(5) Every person who commits another crime during the commission of a crime under this section may be punished and prosecuted for the other crime separately.
(6) For the purposes of this section:
(a) "Sexual orientation" has the same meaning as in RCW 49.60.040.
(b) "Threat" means to communicate, directly or indirectly, the intent to:
(i) Cause bodily injury immediately or in the future to the person threatened or to any other person; or
(ii) Cause physical damage immediately or in the future to the property of a person threatened or that of any other person.
(7) Malicious harassment is a class C felony.
(8) The penalties provided in this section for malicious harassment do not preclude the victims from seeking any other remedies otherwise available under law.
(9) Nothing in this section confers or expands any civil rights or protections to any group or class identified under this section, beyond those rights or protections that exist under the federal or state Constitution or the civil laws of the state of Washington.
[ 2010 c 119 § 1; 2009 c 180 § 1; 1993 c 127 § 2; 1989 c 95 § 1; 1984 c 268 § 1; 1981 c 267 § 1.]
NOTES:
RCW 9A.36.083
Malicious harassment—Civil action.
In addition to the criminal penalty provided in RCW 9A.36.080 for committing a crime of malicious harassment, the victim may bring a civil cause of action for malicious harassment against the harasser. A person may be liable to the victim of malicious harassment for actual damages, punitive damages of up to ten thousand dollars, and reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred in bringing the action.
[ 1993 c 127 § 3.]
NOTES:
Severability—1993 c 127: See note following RCW 9A.36.078.
_____________________________________________________________

RCW 9A.36.078
Malicious harassment—Finding.
The legislature finds that crimes and threats against persons because of their race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, or mental, physical, or sensory handicaps are serious and increasing. The legislature also finds that crimes and threats are often directed against interracial couples and their children or couples of mixed religions, colors, ancestries, or national origins because of bias and bigotry against the race, color, religion, ancestry, or national origin of one person in the couple or family. The legislature finds that the state interest in preventing crimes and threats motivated by bigotry and bias goes beyond the state interest in preventing other felonies or misdemeanors such as criminal trespass, malicious mischief, assault, or other crimes that are not motivated by hatred, bigotry, and bias, and that prosecution of those other crimes inadequately protects citizens from crimes and threats motivated by bigotry and bias. Therefore, the legislature finds that protection of those citizens from threats of harm due to bias and bigotry is a compelling state interest.
The legislature also finds that in many cases, certain discrete words or symbols are used to threaten the victims. Those discrete words or symbols have historically or traditionally been used to connote hatred or threats towards members of the class of which the victim or a member of the victim's family or household is a member. In particular, the legislature finds that cross burnings historically and traditionally have been used to threaten, terrorize, intimidate, and harass African Americans and their families. Cross burnings often preceded lynchings, murders, burning of homes, and other acts of terror. Further, Nazi swastikas historically and traditionally have been used to threaten, terrorize, intimidate, and harass Jewish people and their families. Swastikas symbolize the massive destruction of the Jewish population, commonly known as the holocaust. Therefore, the legislature finds that any person who burns or attempts to burn a cross or displays a swastika on the property of the victim or burns a cross or displays a swastika as part of a series of acts directed towards a particular person, the person's family or household members, or a particular group, knows or reasonably should know that the cross burning or swastika may create a reasonable fear of harm in the mind of the person, the person's family and household members, or the group.
The legislature also finds that a hate crime committed against a victim because of the victim's gender may be identified in the same manner that a hate crime committed against a victim of another protected group is identified. Affirmative indications of hatred towards gender as a class is the predominant factor to consider. Other factors to consider include the perpetrator's use of language, slurs, or symbols expressing hatred towards the victim's gender as a class; the severity of the attack including mutilation of the victim's sexual organs; a history of similar attacks against victims of the same gender by the perpetrator or a history of similar incidents in the same area; a lack of provocation; an absence of any other apparent motivation; and common sense.
[ 1993 c 127 § 1.]
NOTES:
____________________________________________________________

RCW 9A.36.070
Coercion.
(1) A person is guilty of coercion if by use of a threat he or she compels or induces a person to engage in conduct which the latter has a legal right to abstain from, or to abstain from conduct which he or she has a legal right to engage in.
(2) "Threat" as used in this section means:
(a) To communicate, directly or indirectly, the intent immediately to use force against any person who is present at the time; or
(b) Threats as defined in *RCW 9A.04.110(27) (a), (b), or (c).
(3) Coercion is a gross misdemeanor.
[ 2011 c 336 § 361; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.36.070.]
NOTES:
*Reviser's note: RCW 9A.04.110 was amended by 2011 c 166 § 2, changing subsection (27) to subsection (28).
from katrinesackett32463whitelady(5'3)(521/2)

Views: 
952
Post type: 
Author: 
training time
Business or Product name: 
Address: 
7101 North Interstate Highway 35
Jarrell, TX 76537
United States